Marine Raiders on Bougainville, Solomon Islands, January 1944The Marine Raiders were an elite unit established by the United States Marine Corps during World War II and disbanded by the end of the war. The Raiders were created by an order from President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, acting on advice from (later, Brigadier General) Evans F. Carlson. Carlson, an ex-Marine, had spent years observing the tactics and strategy of Communist Chinese irregulars (Zhu De and the 8th Route Army in particular) as they fought the occupying Japanese, and had become enthralled with their version of guerilla warfare. Carlson rejoined the Marines in April 1941, gaining a commission from the Commandant as a reserve major.

With America thrust into the war, the President became interested in creating an American counterpart to the British Commandos in the Marine Corps. (Indeed, some reports tell that the Raiders were initially going to be called the 'Marine Commandos'.) The Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General Thomas Holcomb, killed two birds with one stone and combined Carlson's guerrilla proposal with the President's Commando idea. (Carlson had the President's ear as well, having befriended FDR's son, Captain James Roosevelt.) By the end of February 1942, two Raider Battalions had been established. Carlson was given a promotion to Lieutenant Colonel and placed in command of the 2nd Raider Battalion. The commander of the 1st Raider Battalion, Lt. Col. (later, Major General) Merritt A. "Red Mike" Edson, had previously been in charge of a unit used to practice landing techniques and various new ideas.

The Raiders were given the best of the Marines' equipment, and were handpicked from available volunteers. Carlson's unit took a different direction than Edson's; Carlson borrowed some of the principles learned from his years with the 8th in China. Lt. Col. Carlson infused his men with elements of the Communist philosophy, treating officers and enlisted men equally, even to the point of using the phrase 'Gung-ho!' as a rallying cry.. However, the 1st had a unique structure as well, set up by Edson in his pre-Raider days. Edson still held true to traditional Marine Corps doctrine in most ways, and the two Battalions were quite dissimilar. It seemed the only thing they had in common were their names and status as elite units.

Both battalions were put into action at roughly the same time. Carlson's 2nd boarded the USS Nautilus and the USS Argonaut and performed a raid on Makin Island, a small Japanese base in the Pacific. The success of the raid was debatable; though the Japanese force was almost entirely wiped out, the intention was to divert Japanese men and materiel to smaller bases like Makin instead of larger targets (i.e. Guadalcanal), and the overall effect of the raid in that respect was questionable. The operation (being a raid rather than a full invasion) was quick, and casualties were relatively light, including nine men unintentionally left on the island when the Raiders returned to the submarines.

Meanwhile (several days earlier), Edson's 1st (along with the 1st Marine Division and others) hit the beach on the Solomon Islands. Operation Watchtower, in sharp contrast to Makin, would last several months and prove to be some of the toughest fighting of the Pacific Campaign. After their initial capture of Tulagi, the Raiders were moved to Guadalcanal. One of their most notable battles was on "Edson's Bloody Ridge", where the 1st Raiders, remnants of the 1st Parachute Battalion, and the 2nd of the 5th Marines scored a major tactical victory over Imperial Japanese Army forces.

The 1st Marine Divison is an extremely skilled group of American leathernecks. They constanty proved their bravery and skill in combat. They were the first troops in Guadalcanal. Outnumbered, they fought the better equipped and better fed Japanese troops to a stand still. Later they participated in many other campaings including the battles of Peleilu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. Equipped with Raider battalions, and its own paramarines, the fighting 1st was ready for anything

The Marine Raiders came into existence to meet the need for special amphibious attack forces similar to the British Commandos. They were organized, equipped, armed and trained to fulfill three primary and several secondary missions.

• Carry out surprise landings and hard hitting raids on short notice from submarines and destroyers and other transport.

• Infiltrate enemy lines and conduct guerilla warfare for extended periods of time.

• Spearhead major amphibious landings where the approaches were difficult and the beaches confined.

The Raiders were also trained for land and amphibious reconnaissance missions using whatever means of transport available (such as native dug out canoes). Following Pearl Harbor Japanese Land, Sea and Air forces swept across the Pacific, according to their timetable, overpowering whatever resistance they encountered. The British, Dutch, French and American forces were completely surprised and ill equipped to effectively resist. The subsequent fall of Singapore, considered impregnable by the British, led some military observers to consider the Japanese armed forces to be invincible. The Japanese High Command had the same opinion.

This was generally the situation when the Marine Raider Battalions were activated. The vital statistics are as follows:

1. 1st Raider Battalion (designated on Feb. 16, 1942) was commanded by Lt. Col. Merrit A. Edson.

2. 2nd Raider Battalion(designated Feb. 19, 1942) was commanded by Lt. Col. Evans F. Carlson.

3. 3rd Raider Battalion(designated Sept. 20, 1942) was commanded by Lt. Col. Harry B. Liversedge.

4. 4th Marine Raider Battalion(designated Oct. 23, 1942) was commanded by Lt. Col. James Roosevelt, succeeded in May 1943 by Lt. Col. Michael S. Currin.

As each Raider Battalion was organized, they began extended, intensive, and diverse training and were ready to fulfill their missions in the order they were activated. The inflated confidence of the Japanese High Command was soon to be punctured by events at Midway and the Southern Solomons.

THE FIRST LAND COUNTEROFFENSIVE

In the early hours of Aug.7, 1942, the First Raider Battalion (Edson’s Raiders) attacked Tulagi as a part of the first amphibious ground counter offensive against the Japanese Empire. Another Marine special unit, the First Parachute Battalion, assaulted Gavutu the same morning. While across Skylark channel the 1st Marine Division was beginning the Battle of Guadalcanal.

[To generate confusion, on Aug. 17-18 two companies of the 2nd Raider Battalion (Carlson’s Raiders) debarked in rubber boats from the submarines Nautilus and Argonaut and slipped ashore on Makin Atoll. Once ashore they systematically eliminated the garrison, destroyed their radio facilities and supplies. The raid distracted the enemy from possible reinforcement of Guadalcanal with troops from that area. Having accomplished their mission they returned to their transport with many delays and difficulties due to high surf.] On Tulagi Edson’s men found the enemy to be tough and resourceful, but they pressed their attack with great energy and quickly secured the island. After a few days of mopping up the area and reorganizing, the 1st Raiders moved across the channel to Guadalcanal and played a key role in the defense of Henderson Field. The 1st Raiders and the1st Parachute battalion were deployed in defensive positions across a rolling grassy ridge guarding the approach to Henderson Field. During the nights of Sept. 13-14,heavily out numbered, they withstood continuous, close in assaults against their positions. The fighting was intense, vicious and at close quarters for the duration of the battle. Col. Edson continually moved among his men encouraging them and directing the ebb and flow of the battle. Edson’s men prevailed but their casualties were very heavy. Following the battle many were decorated for heroism including Col. Edson who received the Medal of Honor. The battle has been named in his honor as "The Battle of Edson’s Ridge."

The 1st Raiders continued to play a very significant role in achieving the final victory on Guadalcanal. They participated in the battles of Tasimboko, 1st and 2nd Matanikau River and were finally withdrawn on Oct. 16th to New Caledonia. Prior to the raid on Makin Island by A and B companies, the units of that Battalion had not been idle. On 21 May, 1942, C and D companies were dispatched to bolster the defense of Midway Island, arriving 25 May. During the battle, D company was stationed on North Island and C company supported the defense of Sand Island. The two companies departed Midway following the battle arriving at Camp Catlin 21 June. Following their return Hq.,A, B, E and F Companies embarked aboard APD’s for amphibious training in the vicinity of Midway. They arrived in the area 26 June and returned to Camp Catlin, when training operations were finished, 4 July, 1942. When A and B companies returned from Makin, the united Battalion departed Pearl Harbor 6 September arriving Espiritu Santo, New Hebridies Islands, 12 September, where they prepared to enter the battle of Guadalcanal. Led by Col. Carlson they landed on a remote beach at Aola Bay and slipped into the jungle. Employing the tactics devised by Col. Carlson they operated for thirty seven days behind the enemy’s lines ambushing Japanese units and destroying his installations and supplies. After inflicting more casualties on the enemy than their numbers they re-entered Marine lines near the Matanikau river. Their highly successful operation became known as The Long Patrol. On 15,Dec.the 2nd Raiders were withdrawn to their base camp on Espiritu Santo.

The Third Raider Battalion was activated 20 Sept. 1942 on the island of Samoa. It was the only Raider Battalion formed overseas and was under the able command of Lt. Col .Harry B. Liversedge This fine unit consisted of volunteers from Marine units on the island plus a cadre of 27 officers and men from both the 1st and 2nd Raiders. To provide for the proper training the battalion moved in January,1943 to Espirtu Santo. Then in the middle of February they moved up to Guadalcanal to prepare for the invasion of the Russell Islands.

Their objective was the island of Pavuvu while a U.S. Army unit would assault the island of Banika. The 3rd Raiders moved up the slot on APD’s during the night of 20 February subsequently making an unopposed landing in rubber boats early morning 21 Feb. It was soon apparent the Japanese had evacuated the island leaving a horde of rats behind. After securing the island they settled down to a month of garrison duty. Finally on 20 Mar. the 3rd Raiders were withdrawn to a base camp in Noumea, New Caledonia by way of Espirtu Santo. On 12, Sept. the 2nd and 3rd Raiders were re-designated the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 2nd Marine Raider Regiment (provisional) 1MAC. under the command of Lt. Col. Alan Shapley. Both units began intensive training in preparation for the assault on Bougainville.

UP THE SLOT-NEW GEORGIA

Following the Makin raid, Major James Roosevelt, Executive Officer of the 2nd Raiders returned to the states to command the 4th Raider Battalion. This unit was activated 23, Oct. at Camp Pendleton and immediately began Raider training at a remote location known to the Raiders as tent camp 3. On 8 Feb. 1943, their training completed, they boarded the US President Polk for transport to Espirtu Santo, New Hebrides Islands. On arrival the 4th Raiders established their base camp and continued extensive training with emphasis on night operations. On 22, March their designation was changed to 4th Raider Battalion, 1st Marine Raider Regiment and their company designations were changed accordingly. Also in May Lt. Col. Michael S Currin assumed command of the battalion when Lt. Col. Roosevelt returned to states for medical reasons. The 4th Raiders moved to an advanced base at Tetere, Guadalcanal 2 June 1943 to prepare for combat operations on New Georgia.

Raiders and Their War Dogs

In late June the counter offensive against the Japanese, continued to move up the slot. The 4th Raiders were assigned two concurrent missions that would require dividing the command. Lt. Col. Currin assumed responsibility for the move against Viru Harbor utilizing O, P and part of Hq. Companies, while the Executive Officer Major James R.Clark would command N, Q and the rest of Hq. Companies for the invasion of Vangunu Island.

Currin’s Raiders boarded APD’s at Tetere 20 June for the move north. In the early morning hours of 21 June they went ashore at Segi Pt. And quickly organized a defensive perimeter.

Embarking in rubber boats early evening 27 June, Currin’s Raiders moved west along the coast to Regi village. By 2:00 A.M. 28 June, they were safely ashore. a perimeter established and return of their boats to Segi in progress. At dawn, the Raiders began their advance on Viru Harbor through jungle terrain that defies description. Delayed and hampered by slimy thick mud, mangrove swamps and entangling jungle growth they pressed continually forward. Despite all these obstacles and sudden fire fights in which casualties were incurred, they enveloped and captured Viru Harbor on 1 July.The Raiders movement from Segi to Viru Harbor remains as a classic example of the hazards of jungle warfare. On 10 July Currin’s men boarded LCI’s at Viru and returned to their base at Tetere to await further orders.

Major Clark’s Raiders boarded APD’s at Tetere 28 June, and entered Oleana Bay, Wickham Anchorage early morning 30 June. Landing operations began in darkness as scheduled but soon were disrupted by heavy rain, strong winds and high surf. As a result some units were put ashore 6 miles from the designated beaches. However, there was no panic and scattered units quickly got their bearings, moved inland and made their way toward the beachhead. Major Clark moved out from the beach with less than 100 men confident that the scattered units would soon join him. The Coastwatcher Trail they followed was a sea of mud and jungle growth hampered their movement as well as two rivers running deep and strong. Regardless, by 1:30 they were in position to attack the Japanese positions in Kaeruka village. Fortunately the delays had allowed all the scattered units to rejoin the main body and participate in the assault.

NOTE: The Vangunu operations were under the overall command of Lt. Col. Lester E. Brown USA. Major Clark of the Raiders was subject to his orders and operational plans. This brief review is concerned only with the activities of the Marine Raiders.

The coordinated attack by the Raiders and Army troops was launched around 2:00 P.M. Resistance was light initially but became very heavy as the attack developed. Under steady pressure the Japanese defenders became confused and in late afternoon the two Raider companies were able to push through to the beach. The Army units also broke through to complete the victory. Major Clark quickly had the Raiders consolidate their positions and establish a strong perimeter facing both the Kaeruka river and the beach. This proved to be a wise decision. The early evening was uneventful but in the early morning the Japanese made an abortive attempt to land from three barges. They probably thought they were in the rear of our defenses. The Raiders and the USA troops were alert and quickly destroyed the landing force.

Clark’s Raiders were detached from Lt . Col. Brown’s command on 4 July, and returned by LCI transport to Oleana Bay to rest and reorganize. A few days later they were transported to Gatukai Island to search for Japanese troops reported to be there by natives. Combat patrols found evidence of their recent presence but apparently had been evacuated. Clark’s Raiders returned to Oleana on the 12th of July, and then by LCI transport to their base at Tetere, Guadalcanal.

NORTHERN LANDING FORCE

The northern Landing Force, commanded by Col. Harry B. Liversedge, composed of the 1st Raider Battalion and two Army Battalions embarked 4 July on APD’s at Tetere Pt. (The movements and missions of the Army units are beyond the scope of this review).

The Task Force entered Kula Gulf early 5 July,and began debarking troops at 0130. The landing in darkness was made under difficult and confusing conditions and harassing fire from 140mm guns located at Enogai Inlet. However, Raider training and know how prevailed and by 0600 troops were safely ashore and reorganizing.

At dawn the Raiders began their advance toward Enogai that was about six air miles distance. The obstacles encountered paralleled those that faced Currin’s Raiders on their march to Viru. Hampered by heavy rains, deep slimy mud, swamps, swollen rivers and streams the Raiders moved relentlessly toward their objective. On 10July,the fought two fierce battles at Triri and Enogai resulting in capture of Enogai Inlet and all facilities. Casualties were heavy but the Raiders quickly organized the area for defense. In the following days they were able to evacuate their wounded, rest and begin extensive reconnaissance of the next objective Bairoko Harbor.

Following their missions at Viru and Vangunu the 4th Raiders reverted to the command of Col. Liversedge. On 17 July, they embarked on APD’s and joined his command the next day at Enogai. On landing they took up defensive positions and prepared for the assault on Bairoko.

NOTE: The operational plans for the attack on Bairoko were based on intelligence estimates of 500 Japanese troops divided between Enogai and Bairoko. In reality Bairoko had been reinforced by the 2nd Battalion,45th Infantry and 8th Battery, 6th Field Artillery from Bougainville. The Raiders were in a no win situation.

Early morning 20 July,the Raiders began their approach to Bairoko. The attack force consisting of companies B and D 1st Raiders and the 4th Raiders with companies N thru Q in echelon. A reinforced platoon of the 1st would provide a base of fire from a sand spit near the beach. An air strike had been requested on their objective for 0900 but it was never delivered. Soon contact was made with the enemy’s outpost line and the 1st Raiders quickly deployed and went into the assault. The ensuing battle raged for more than 8 hours. One by one the companies joined the assault and the enemy was pressed into an area estimated to be 300 X 800 yards. By dusk both battalions had suffered very heavy casualties and were exhausted. Reluctantly the order was given to terminate the action and retire. Bringing out their wounded with panchos they slowly withdrew to defensive positions. (From my viewpoint in volume of fire and sheer savagery this battle has no equal - I was there and am prejudiced.)

The Raiders withdrew to Enogai the following morning, took up again their defensive positions and resumed extensive patrolling. On the 28 & 29th August the Raiders embarked on APD’s and returned to their base at Tetere, unaware that they had fought their last battle as Marine Raiders.

BOUGAINVILLE

The designation of both the 2nd and 3rd Raiders, who were refitting and training on New Caledonia, were changed 12 Sept.,1943. They would now be the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 2nd Marine Raider Regiment (provisional 1MAC.

On 4 October the 2nd Raiders embarked on the President Hayes and disembarked 11 October at Guadalcanal. The 3rd Raiders embarked 6 October on the President Adams and disembarked at Kokumbona, Guadalcanal 11 Oct,1943 and encamped next to the 9th Marines, 3rd Marine Division.

The 2nd Raider Regiment was commanded by Col. Alan Shapley and Lt. Col. Joseph P. McCaffery assumed command of the 2nd Raiders. Lt. Col. Fred D. Beans was now in command of the 3rd Battalion.

Following the usual period of training and landing rehearsals, both Raider Battalions sailed 30 October, with the 1MAC task force for the assault on Bougainville scheduled for 1 Nov.1943. The operational plans for the landing were intricate with many assignments and missions. The dispositions of the Raider Battalions were as follows:

3rd Raiders on Bougainville

The 2nd Raiders were attached to 3rd Marine Division and Green Beach #1 at 0730 on the mainland.

The 3rd Raiders: I and K companies and part of Hq. Co. landed at 0730 on Green Beach #1 on the north side of Puruata Island and experienced heavy resistance. M company landed on Green Beach #2 on the mainland and their mission was to establish a roadblock on the Mission Trail a mile north of the Beachead. L company landed over Green Beach later in the day.

As the campaign progressed the Raiders were frequently attached to units of the 3rd Division and used as regular infantry battalions not as specialized units. However the Raiders played a key role in accomplishing the objectives of 1MAC and reaching the Final Beachhead Line. For 72 days the Raiders proved their worth and participated in the following major engagements:

• Battle of Piva Forks-9 Nov.1943
• Battle of Coconut Grove-13 Nov.1943
• Battle of Numa Numa Trail-19 Nov.1943

The two Raider Battalions performed brilliantly under the most difficult conditions and suffered very heavy casualties. On 12 Jan.1944, the Raiders were withdrawn from the combat zone and embarked on naval transport. On 14 Jan.1944, both Raider Battalions disembarked at Tassafaronga, unaware that the Marine Raiders were passing into history.

TO THE GUILLOTINE

On 1 February 1944, it became official that the character of the war had so changed that Raider Battalions were no longer needed (doesn’t that have a nice ring to it?).

The 1st, 3rd, and 4th Raiders became the 1st, 2nd,and 3rd Battalions of the Fourth Marine Regiment while the 2nd Raiders became the Weapons Company. Again establishing the old China Regiment that had fought and lost at Corregidor. The Raiders believe they have left a legacy for those coming after us and that is why this web site exists. Dan Marsh.

You can read much more by going to Dan Marsh’s Marine Raider’s Web Site and you can hear it first hand from one the United States Marine Corps Finest.

http://www.usmcraiders.com/1AnnFact.htm

The Marine Raider Battalion

There is a reluctance amongst military formations which consider themselves elite to form subunits which feel themselves even further set apart.  Despite it size, the Marine Corps rightly considered itself a select body.  Yet for a short while there existed within the Corps a body of troops who regarded themselves as that little bit different.  These were the Marine Raiders.

The Raiders endured an odd relationship with the rest of the Corps.  The intention was clear enough; to provide a swift, highly mobile force which could hit Japanese interests and be gone before the enemy could react.  The feeling it seems was that any Marine unit should be capable of doing so, so why the need for such a  'specialist' outfit?  The same problem had faced the British Commandos.  The Royal Marines had four Battalions of men perfectly capable of undertaking assaults from the sea, so why did the Army want the same?  In Britain the argument was quelled by the intervention of Winston Churchill.  He wanted the Commandos and, thankfully, he got them.  The Royal Marines converted to the same structure and were rewarded for their patience when the Army Commandos were demobilised at the end of the war, not the Marines.

The Marine Raiders had no such benefactor though, and at the beginning of 1944 the existing units were either deactivated or re-designated as 'normal' Marine Battalions.

The Marine Raider Battalion, circa 1942

Headquarters Company (11 Officers, 139 men)

Battalion Headquarters (9 Officers, 82 men)

Motor Platoon (1 Officer, 35 men)

Communication Platoon (1 Officer, 22 men)

Weapons Company (7 Officers, 204 men)

Company Headquarters (2 Officers, 31 men)

Mortar Platoon (1 Officer, 35 men)

Two Machine Gun Platoons, each (1 Officer, 32 men)

Demolition Platoon (2 Officers, 74 men)

Four Rifle Companies (5 Officers, 130 men) each comprised of;

Company Headquarters (1 Officer, 17 men)

Weapons Platoon comprised of;

Platoon HQ (1 Officer, 4 men)

Antitank Rifle Section (7 men)

Mortar Section (9 men)

Machine Gun Section (9 men)

Three Rifle Platoons, each comprised of;

Platoon HQ (1 Officer, 4 men)

Three Rifle Squads, each comprised of 8 men

Total Strength of 901 all ranks (38 Officers and 863 men)

Points of note

Akin to the British Commandos, the Raiders took their existing Battalion formation and trimmed it down.  In this case, it facilitated the formation of a fourth Rifle Company.  The total all ranks is inclusive of US Navy personnel who provided medical staff for the Battalion as elsewhere in the Marines.

The elements of the Battalion

Battalion Headquarters - contained the command staff and various admin personnel who were no doubt segregated into a 'Company Headquarters' as was common to all US units.  The Battalion also maintained an interesting 'Weapon Pool' with twenty two extra BARs, two light machine guns and two hundred .45 cal sub machine guns.  These were issued to the Rifle Squads as required, as discussed below.

Motor Platoon - the Quartermaster and supply elements, along with the Battalion's sparse transportation.

Communication Platoon - provided the usual signals services

Mortar Platoon - the Mortar Platoon was the first sign this was a light infantry unit as it served just three 60 mm mortars.  The 81 mm was obviously more effective but it weighed more and less ammunition could be carried for the same weight load.  Interestingly, Battalion HQ carried a further four 60 mm weapons in reserve, suggesting the Platoon could potentially double its  firepower if required.

Machine Gun Platoon - the Machine Gun Platoons again demonstrated the light weight approach, each serving four M1919A4 light machine guns.  No heavy M1917s were carried.

Demolition Platoon - the Demolition Platoon typified the Raider aim of getting in, blowing up items the Japanese regarded as important and then leaving.  It fielded eight Squads, each of eight men, plus the usual Platoon and Section commanders.

The Rifle Company - the Rifle Company was far larger than its Ranger and Commando contemporaries.  Its building block the,  Rifle Squad, provides one of those conundrums of organisation that often appear just when you think you understand matters.

The key difference is the deployment of an eight man Rifle Squad, comprised of a Corporal, four riflemen, two automatic riflemen and a sniper.  The first five men were each armed with a rifle, the two automatic gunners each a BAR, and the sniper the M1903 Springfield.  Platoon HQ is a much larger affair, with a Lieutenant and Sergeant, armed with Carbines, a Sergeant Guide and two runners, armed with rifles. 

This Squad is notably different to the nine man version described in much of the literature on the Raiders, and provides a classic example of the reorganisation of units in the field to meet tactical circumstances.

In this, three teams, each of three men became a favoured option.  In some operations, this was used to field a unique blend of automatic firepower.  Two teams were each equipped with a pair of sub machine guns and one rifle.  The third team substituted a BAR for one of the SMGs.  This naturally meant the Squad had a much reduced range, but reportedly it was a highly efficient unit in combat and despite its weapons not given to wasteful use of ammunition.  If no additional men were provided in this model, then Platoon HQ would have had to shrink to perhaps no more than an Officer and one man, almost certainly the Platoon Sergeant.

The Weapons Platoon served two 60 mm mortars and two M1919A4 light machine guns in its two Sections.  The really intriguing thing though is that it also carried two British Army .55 cal Boys Anti Tank Rifles. A few Boys models were procured for evaluation but quickly rejected as obsolete.  The Marines in general though were not high on the list for receipt of the new Bazooka in 1942 and the Raiders less so.  The Boys could penetrate a light Japanese tank, the type most likely to be encountered and perhaps it was for this reason they were adopted.  There were two more in the Weapons Company and four more at Battalion.  In time they were no doubt replaced by Bazookas.

Company HQ added two Navy medics and a Captain with the usual NCOs and runners and admin staff.

Summary

The Raider Battalion looked decidedly heavy compared to the stripped back Rangers.  However, there were variations even between the Raider Battalions themselves.  2nd Raiders tried six Rifle Companies and no Weapons Company for example.  The four Raider Battalions eventually settled on three Rifle and one Weapons Company during 1943, though there were other formats before this.  Quite how these changes impacted on the Battalion organisation can only be guessed at.   

Three of the Raider Battalions were used to reconstitute the 'missing' 4th Marine Regiment in early 1944 and the Raider concept passed into history.  In their remarkably short service career though, the Raiders proved the value of light infantry operations against Japanese garrisons.  But as the campaign drew ever closer to the Home Islands, the Marines were not interested in hit and run tactics.  The ground they took they intended to keep, and as such the Raider concept was deemed exhausted.

Gung-ho

Gung-ho is a phrase borrowed from Chinese, frequently used in English as an adjective meaning enthusiastic. The original Mandarin phrase is gōnghè (工合), a standard abbreviation for gōngyè hézuòshè (工業合作社), meaning industrial worker's cooperative. (It is true that gōng means work and hè means together, but gōnghè by itself is not a standard Chinese term and serves only as an abbreviation for the longer phrase: an English-language analogy would be "IndCoop".)

The phrase entered the American vernacular when it was picked up by then-Major Evans F. Carlson, USMC. According to Carlson, it was used as a slogan by the WW2-era Chinese Communist Party's 8th Route Army, led by Zhu De. However, Carlson's purpose was inspirational, not necessarily historical, and this claim may be inaccurate.

Carlson traveled with the 8th, and later used gung ho during his (unconventional) command of the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion. From there it spread throughout the Marine Corps (hence the association between the two) and into American society as a whole. It is now often used in the ironic sense of excessively enthusiastic, overzealous.

To find out more about the United States Marine Corps Marine Raiders head for this site.Marine Raiders http://www.usmcraiders.com/